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Abstract: The paper analyzes the chances for the truth to be found and broadly accepted under conditions of 
cognitive division of labour combined with a social exchange process. Cognitive division of labour means, 
that only some individuals are active truth seekers, possibly with different capacities. The social exchange 
process consists in an exchange of opinions between all individuals, whether truth seekers or not. We de-
velop a model which is investigated by both, mathematical tools and computer simulations. As an analytical 
result the Funnel theorem states that under rather weak conditions on the social process a consensus on the 
truth will be reached if all individuals posses an arbitrarily small inclination for truth seeking. The Leading 
the pack theorem states that under certain conditions even a single truth seeker may lead all individuals to 
the truth. Systematic simulations analyze how close and how fast groups can get to the truth depending on 
the frequency of truth seekers, their capacities as truth seekers, the position of the truth (more to the extreme 
or more in the centre of an opinion space), and the willingness to take into account the opinions of others 
when exchanging and updating opinions. A tricky movie visualizes simulations results in a parameter space 
of higher dimensions. 
Keywords: opinion dynamics, consensus/dissent, bounded confidence, truth, social epistemology, 
division of labour. 
1. Introduction: Opinion Dynamics and Truth 
There is an ongoing research on opinion dynamics since almost 50 years.
1 Research started 
with French (1956). Important early steps did Harary (1959), Abelson (1964), De Groot 
(1974), Chatterjee (1975), Chatterjee/Seneta (1977), Lehrer (1975) and Lehrer/Wagner 
(1981). More recent work was done by Galam et al. (1982), Galam / Moscovici (1991), Fried-
kin / Johnsen (1990), Nowak et al. (1990), Krause (1997), Hegselmann et al. (1999), Deffuant 
et al. (2000), Dittmer (2001), Weisbuch et al. (2001), Hegselmann / Krause (2002, 2004), 
Stauffer (2002, 2003, 2004), Lorenz (2003, 2005), Fortunato (2004, 2005) and Fortunato et al. 
(2005). 
Roughly, the following three main lines of study can be distinguished. There is an approach 
mainly developed by physicists and based on statistical mechanics. A second route empha-
sizes the social structure underlying opinion formation. A third line analyzes opinion forma-
tion as a discrete dynamical system. That is our approach. It provides a formal framework that 
covers various kinds of opinion formation among a set I of n individuals and a discrete time t 
                                           
1 For an historical and systematic overview cf. Hegselmann / Krause (2002, ch. 1-3).   2
= 0, 1, 2, … . Each individual starts in t = 0 with a certain opinion, expressed by a real number 
xi (0)∈]0, 1].
2  An opinion dynamics is then given by 
[1]  ( ) ( ) () 1 ,with 1 ii x tf x t i += ≤ ≤ n . 
fi  is the decisive function – so far not specified – that operates on the opinion profile 
x(t) = (x1(t), …, xi (t), …, xn (t)). 
By specifying fi a good deal of opinion dynamics mentioned beforehand can be covered. 
Over the last ten years or so research on opinion dynamics intensified dramatically. Lots of 
papers published since then study versions of the so called bounded confidence–model (BC–
model), a label coined by Krause 1998 (see Krause 2000). In that model individuals take into 
account the opinions of those others whose opinions are not 'too strange', i.e. not too far away 
from their own opinion.
3 The set of those others that individual i takes seriously is the subset 
of those others j∈I for which the distance in opinion, i.e. ⎢xi(t) – xj(t) ⎢, is not greater than a 
certain ε, the confidence level. Updating one's opinion consists in averaging over all opinions 
within that distance.
4
In this paper we extend and modify the BC–model in a way that it explicitly covers a process 
in which truth seekers go for the truth. We will do that sticking to our macroscopic, non–
normative approach guided by the KISS–heuristics "Keep it simple, stupid!" As a conse-
quence, we will not even try to model explicitly all the processes and actions in the quest for 
truth (rational argumentation, reasonable thinking, weighing evidences, making experiments 
etc.). What we do instead is to cover all which might be important by the assumptions that 
there is a true value T in our opinion space ]0,1] and that this true value T somehow 'attracts' 
the individuals – at least some and to some degree. Our decisive equation is 
[2]  () ( ) ( ) () 1 1 ,with 1 ii i i x tT f x t i αα += +− ≤ ≤ n
                                          
. 
 
2 It is convenient to scale opinions to have values in the unit interval. To allow for the formation of means like 
the geometric mean we exclude the value 0. 
3 Thus the model assumes agents which somehow and 'their way' solved the problem Isaac Levi emphasizes: 
"The mere fact that someone disagrees with one's judgement is insufficient grounds for opening one's mind. 
Most epistemologists forget that it is just as urgent a question to determine when we are justified in opening up 
our minds as it is to determine when we are justified in closing them" (Levi 1985, 3). 
4 The BC–model was formulated and studied for the first time by Krause (1997). Krause (2000) shows for certain 
conditions the convergence to consensus for a general non autonomous model of opinion dynamics; the BC–
model is analysed as a special case. Beckmann (1997) and Dittmer (2000 and 2001) take up the idea and do 
some further steps towards an analytical understanding of the model. Hegselmann / Krause (2002) combine an 
analytical and simulation based approach. The result is a very comprehensive understanding of the BC–model. 
The understanding includes the effects of different sizes of the confidence intervals, different types of biased 
confidence intervals (e.g.: leftists 'listen' more to the left, rightists 'listen' more to the right) or multidimensional 
opinion spaces. Lorenz (2003) presents simulation results of the model's behaviour for up to four opinion dimen-
sions. Lorenz (2003a) analyses the effects of heterogeneous confidence levels. Hegselmann (2004) proposes, 
describes and partially analyses several extensions and modifications of the BC-model, for instance effects of 
local interactions, different updating procedures, overlaying opinion–formation–mechanisms etc. Since the 
arithmetic mean is only one of the infinite numbers of possible means Hegselmann / Krause (2004) analyse the 
often dramatic effects of different ways of averaging for the BC-model. Fortunato (2004) uses discrete opinions. 
Lorenz (2005) proves a stabilization theorem. Urbig / Lorenz (2004) study systematically the effects of different 
updating procedures. Fortunato (2005) analyses the BC–model in a 2-dimensional opinion space. 
A model very similar to Krause's original BC–model in Krause (1997) was later introduced and investigated in 
(Weisbuch et al. 2001) and (Deffuant et al. 2000). The difference to the original BC–model is that the authors 
use a pairwise–sequential updating procedure instead of simultaneous updating.   3
In equation [2] the opinion of individual i is given by a convex combination with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. 
The first part αi T is the objective component. αi controls the strength of the attraction of truth. 
The second part with the weight (1−αi) is the social component, with fi  being a function of 
the opinion profile x(t)= (x1(t), x2(t), …, xn-1(t), xn(t)). The whole profile of functions in the 
social component is f= ( f1, f2, …, fn-1, fn ). To that profile we will refer as the social process. 
For αi = 0 we get again our original dynamics governed by [1], i.e. a situation in which only a 
social process is at work and the truth does not play any role. The framework offers a fairly 
natural (though abstract) understanding of cognitive division of labour: By cognitive division 
of labour we refer to a situation in which only some individuals i have an αi > 0. 
Since equation [2] is threatened with misunderstandings some clarifying remarks on the inter-
pretation and status of [2] will be helpful: 
•  Could [2] be a mechanism intentionally followed by our individuals? No! The simple rea-
son is that whoever understands the concept of truth and somehow knows T would imme-
diately believe that T, i.e. update xi(t +1) = T. The interpretation of [2] should be about the 
following: Individuals with a positive α have access to or generate new data (arguments, 
evidences, test results etc.) that point in the direction of T. Nevertheless their and their fel-
lows' prior opinions are in their mental or cognitive backpack and influence them as well. 
•  What is assumed on the nature of truth? It is assumed, that the truth is one and only one, 
that it does not change over time, that it is somewhere in the opinion space, and that it is 
independent of the opinions the individuals hold. The truth influences opinions, but the 
opinions don't have any impact on the truth. Ever since the beginning of philosophy there 
has been a discussion on the nature of truth, its general concept and status, definition, cri-
teria, indicators etc. The commonsensical assumptions on the truth made above are not 
compatible with all known conceptions of truth. They are compatible with a correspon-
dence theory of truth, but so called deflationists shouldn't have any problem to accept 
them as well.
5 Thus, the problem with [2] is not so much a built–in partisanship in an on-
going debate on the nature of truth. (More on compatibility problems will follow when 
some central features of the dynamics driven by [2] are analyzed.) 
•  How to make sense of an 'attraction of truth'? For αi > 0 truth attracts in a technical sense. 
But this technical feature of the equation is used to generate a process which must not be 
interpreted in such a way that truth attracts anybody in a literal sense. The technical at-
traction of truth is used to model individuals, which to a certain degree successfully aim at 
the truth.
6 Thus, a positive αi could be interpreted as the combined effect of education, 
training, profession, interest, and some epistemic success based on that.
7 A problem is that 
according to [2] the 'attraction of truth' works smoothly in the direction of T. But new evi-
dences might be ambiguous. They may point into different directions or indicate only that 
the truth is not in a certain region of the opinion space. Therefore, [2] should be taken as a 
starting point. Later we (or others) can focus on more complicated epistemic situations. 
Equation [2] is a convex combination of what we called an objective and a social component. 
The social component may actually be the BC–model as characterized above. But obviously 
other social processes could be brought into play as well
8. An interesting alternative social 
process is proposed in the book Rational Consensus in Science and Society, written by Lehrer 
                                           
5 For an overview see the articles on truth in the web based Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html 
6 For the debate on truth approximation cf. Kuipers 2000. For the philosophical debate on truth directedness cf. 
Engel 2004 and the literature mentioned in that article. 
7 Following our macroscopic approach we do not go into details. 
8 Especially if one thinks – as we do – that there are many different and interfering mechanisms that drive real-
world opinion dynamics.   4
and Wagner (1981).
9 The book received major attention especially among philosophers (cf. 
Loewer 1985; Bogdan 1981). It presents a mechanism driven by iterated weighted averaging. 
The weights reflect the respect an individual assigns to other individuals. As in the BC–model 
the opinions are real numbers taken from the unit interval.  The weights an individual assigns 
to others are assumed to sum up to 1. 
We will refer to this model as the Lehrer/Wagner–model (LW–model). Formally it is a dy-
namical system, though – and that is important to notice – the authors do not interpret it as a 
process over time. Their starting point is a "dialectical equilibrium" i.e. a situation after "the 
group has engaged in extended discussion of the issue so that all empirical data and theoreti-
cal ratiocination has been communicated.  … the discussion has sufficiently exhausted the 
scientific information available so that further discussion would not change the opinion of any 
member of the group" (Lehrer/Wagner 1981, 19). The central question for Lehrer and Wagner 
then is: Once the dialectical equilibrium is reached, is there a rational procedure to aggregate 
the normally still divergent opinions in the group (cf. Lehrer 1981b, 229)? Their answer is 
"Yes". The basic idea for the procedure is to make use of the fact that normally we all do not 
only have opinions but also information on expertise or reliability of others. That information 
can be used to assign weights to other individuals. The whole aggregation procedure is then 
iterated weighted averaging with t → ∞ and based on constant weights. It is shown that for 
lots of weight matrices the individuals reach a consensus whatever the initial opinions might 
be – if they only were willing to apply the proposed aggregation procedure.
10
Under our interpretation [2] provides a very general and simple formal framework for the 
study of truth seeking individuals embedded in a community and a cognitive past or tradition. 
The BC– and the LW–model are different instances for the social component. That makes the 
article a contribution to what is now called social epistemology (cf. Schmitt 1994 and 1999; 
Goldman 1999, 2001; Fuller 2002). Under the perspectives of accepted methods, relevant 
questions or common goals social epistemology is more a battlefield than a well established 
discipline.
11 Nevertheless, topics like the cognitive interaction between truth seeking indi-
viduals or the proliferation of the truth in societies only in parts interested in the truth, belong 
to the set of paradigm topics for the project 'social epistemology'. 
In what follows we pursue our studies both ways, by analytical means and by means of simu-
lations. Chapter 2 will demonstrate some interesting effects by single run simulations of opin-
ion dynamics driven by an objective and a social component as outlined in equation [2]. 
Thereby we open the field of Computer Aided Social Epistemology (CASE) with some first 
CASE–studies. In the simulations the social component will be given by the BC–model. 
Chapter 3 gives a short and easy to understand rigorous proof for what we call the Funnel 
theorem. The theorem states conditions under which a community will end up at the truth. 
Chapter 4 formulates a very general theorem that states conditions under which even a single 
truth seeker can drive a whole society to the truth. In chapter 5 the single run CASE–studies 
of chapter 2 are extended to systematic CASE–studies of a whole parameter space. We ana-
lyze the chances for truth proliferation under certain conditions: What if we have a division of 
labor in the sense that only some go for the truth, i.e. not all have a positive αi ?  How does 
                                           
9 Cf. Lehrer 1975, 1976, 1977, 1981 and 1981a. 
10 For analytical results cf. as well Hegselmann /Krause 2002, ch. 2.  
11 Goldman (2001) starts his article "Social Epistemology" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy with the 
following sentences: "Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information. 
There is little consensus, however, on what the term "knowledge" comprehends, what is the scope of the "so-
cial", or what the style or purpose of the study should be. According to some writers, social epistemology should 
retain the same general mission as classical epistemology, revamped in the recognition that classical epistemol-
ogy was too individualistic. According to other writers, social epistemology should be a more radical departure 
from classical epistemology, a successor discipline that would replace epistemology as traditionally conceived."   5
the position of the truth – more in the centre or more to the extremes of the opinion space – 
matter? Additionally, our truth seeking individuals may be more or less 'good' in getting to 
the truth, i.e. their αi  may be small or comparatively great. How does that matter? And how is 
that all influenced by the size of the confidence intervals? Finally a tricky movie shows under 
what conditions societies are how fast and good in getting to the truth. 
In chapter 6 we summarize and give an outline for further research questions and perspec-
tives. The detailed proof for the theorem of chapter 4 is put into an appendix. 
2. CASE–Studies I: Opinion Dynamics among Truth Seeking Agents
12
Throughout this chapter we assume a social process driven by the bounded confidence mecha-
nism. Thus an agents i updates his opinions by averaging over the opinions of all those agents 
j for which ⎢xi(t) – xj(t) ⎢≤ ε, thereby generating a symmetric confidence interval to the left and 
to the right of agent i's opinion. The confidence level ε is supposed to be the same for all 
agents (homogeneity) and constant over time. We assume simultaneous updating. 
Figure 1: 100 agents, random start distribution, ε = 0.05. αi = 0 for all agents i. (We show 50 periods and not 
only the very first to allow for a better comparison with figure 2 in which all individuals are truth seekers while 
the start profile is the same as in figure 1.) 
Figure 1 shows the opinion dynamics for 100 agents and a confidence level ε = 0.05. The 
process starts with an even random distribution. We assume αi = 0 for all agents i. Thus none 
of the agents is a successful truth seeker. The ordinate indicates the opinions. Since it is useful 
for the following analysis the opinions are additionally encoded by colours ranging from red 
(x = 0) to magenta (x = 1). The abscissa represents time and shows the first 50 periods. The 
trajectory of an opinion gets a colour according to its start value. The colouring of the trajec-
tories is done following the order of the profile. The dotted line is the assumed position of the 
truth (T = 0.25) nobody is going for. A grey area between two neighbouring opinions indi-
cates that the distance between the two is not greater than ε. Note that under simultaneous 
updating, given the start profile is ordered in the sense that x1(0) ≤ x2(0), … , xn-1(0) ≤ xn(0), 
                                           
12 In philosophy nobody would refer to individuals as agents. Individuals 'are' individuals or actors. But in the 
world of modelling and simulating it is common to refer to individuals as agents. Since this chapter is less phi-
losophical and more simulation oriented we switch to the terminology used in that field.   6
that order will be preserved over time.
13 If in an ordered profile the distance between two 
neighbouring opinions is never greater than ε then we will call such a profile an ε–profile. If 
the area between two neighbouring opinions is not grey, that indicates something we refer to 
as an ε–split in the profile. Based on that terminology we can easily describe and understand 
what is going on in figure 1:
14 Not even at the start the opinion profile is an ε–profile. Split 
sub–profiles belong to different 'opinion worlds' or communities which do not (or: no longer) 
interact. The extreme opinions of a (split sub–)profile are under a one sided influence and 
move direction centre of the (sub–)profile. As a consequence the range of the (sub–)profile 
shrinks. At the extremes opinions condense. Condensed regions may attract opinions from 
less populated areas within their ε–reach. As a consequence (sub–)profiles may split again. 
Finally the social process gets to a point where in (split sub–)profiles everybody is within the 
ε–reach of everybody else. The logical consequence is that all involved opinions 'collapse' 
into one opinion in the next period. As of then this part of the profile is stable for ever. Stabil-
ity is always reached in finite time (cf. Hegselmann/Krause 2002, ch. 3 result 5 and 6). In fig-
ure 1 stability means an eternal plurality of divergent views.  
Figure 2: 100 agents, same random start distribution as in figure 1, ε = 0.05. αi = 0.1 for all agents i, T = 0.25. 
In figure 2 we have the same confidence level and exactly the same start distribution as in 
figure 1. The difference is that now all agents are truth seekers with a homogeneous αi = 0.1 
for all agents i. So we have a single run example for a dynamics according [2] with αi > 0 and 
the BC–model governing the social exchange process. In figure 1 the truth did not affect the 
dynamics at all. By contrast in figure 2 obviously the whole society is driven direction T. 
Time is the great healer of ε–splits. They all close (again) in finite time. Thus, agents in dif-
ferent sub–profiles whose members mutually found their views – in a fairly literal sense – as 
'out of range' come closer and start to influence each other again. After times of plurality and 
polarization in period 24 a consensus is reached. It is not yet a consensus on the truth T. But 
figure 2 suggests that the consensus is moving direction T, though the society may not get 
there in finite time. Thus we can state: 
                                           
13 That is not true for pair wise sequential updating. The trajectory of an opinion gets a colour according to its 
start value. The colouring of the trajectories is done following the order of the profile. 
14 For more details cf. Hegselmann / Krause (2002), chapter 4.   7
Observation 1: 
There are conditions under which a society of opinions exchanging truth seekers ends up with 
a consensus at least fairly close to the truth (see figure 2). 
Has everybody to be a truth seeker to get a consensus on the truth (or at least on a view close 
to the truth)? As figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the answer to that question is: "No!". In figure 3 
only half of the agents are truth seekers with an α > 0.1. Figure 4 indicates by the colour blue 
who the truth seekers in figure 3 are. The trajectories for agents with α = 0 are red. Since not 
all agents have a positive α  we are facing a situation of a cognitive division of labour as de-
fined above. 
Figure 3: 100 agents, 50% α = 0.1, all others α = 0, ε = 0.1, T = 0.5. 
Observation 2: 
The interplay of both, seeking for the truth by only some – i.e. cognitive division of labour –
and a social exchange process that includes all, may finally lead to a consensus at least fairly 
close to the truth (see figures 3 and 4) . 
In figure 5 we have exactly the same start distribution as in figures 3 and 4. What differs is the 
position of the truth. With T = 0.5 in the dynamics given by the former figures the truth was in 
the centre of the opinion space. In figure 5 we have T = 0.05, i.e. the truth is extreme. And that 
matters. It is still a huge majority of agents, all truth seekers and even almost all with an α = 0 
that move direction truth. Nevertheless some non truth seekers are left behind far distant from 
the truth. 
Observation 3: 
For the feasibility of the consensus on the truth in observation 2 the position of the truth mat-
ters (see figure 5). The consensus may become impossible if the truth is extreme.   8
Figure 4: 100 agents, 50% α = 0.1 (blue), all others (red) α = 0, ε = 0.1, T = 0.5. 
Figure 5: 100 agents, 50% α = 0.1 (blue), all others (red) α = 0, ε = 0.1, T = 0.05. 
In figure 6 we have again exactly the same start distribution and initial conditions as in figures 
3 and 4. What differs is the exact value of α for the 50% α– positives. Now we have α = 0.25.  
As a consequence the α–positives approach the truth much faster than before. The conse-
quence is that non–truth–seekers with start positions more to the extremes of the opinion 
space are left behind and finally stick to opinions far distant from the truth.   9
 
Figure 6: 100 agents, 50% α = 0.25, all others α = 0, ε = 0.1, T = 0.5. 
Observation 4: 
For the feasibility of the consensus in observation 2 the value of α matters. An all including 
consensus on the truth may become impossible if the α–positives are especially fast and good 
in getting closer to the truth (see figure 6). 
Figure 7: 100 agents, 50% α = 0.25, all others α = 0, ε = 0.15, T = 0.5. 
The effect stated by observation 4 may change again if, as figure 7 indicates, the confidence 
level is sufficiently high. In figure 7 start distribution and initial conditions are the same as in 
figure 6 except that for the confidence level we now have ε = 0.15. Under that condition the 
all including consensus on the truth is possible again.   10
Observation 5: 
If a consensus on the truth is not possible for a certain value of α then consensus may never-
theless be possible if the confidence level is sufficiently high (see figure 7). 
But again, the consensus on the truth vanishes if there are not enough α–positives. In figure 8 
we have the same initial conditions as in figure 7 except that the percentage of α– positives is 
reduced to 10%. As a consequence non–truth–seekers with start positions in the lower part of 
the opinion space end up with opinions far distant from the truth. (Though not visible in figure 
8 all opinions in the upper part end up at the truth.) 
Figure 8: 100 agents, 10% α α = 0.25, all others α = 0, ε = 0.15, T = 0.5 
Observation 6: 
A consensus on the truth which is reachable based on a certain percentage of α–positives may 
no longer be reachable if their frequency drops down. Thus, the frequency of truth seekers 
matters (see figure 8). 
Our single run simulations seem to suggest two general ideas: First, if all agents in a social 
exchange process governed by the BC–model are truth seekers, then they end up with a con-
sensus on the truth. Second, whether under cognitive division of labour, i.e. with not all being 
α–positives, finally a consensus on the truth can be expected, depends crucially on the fre-
quency of α–positives, the position of the truth, the confidence level ε  and the value of α,  
i.e. the strength of the truth attraction. In what follows both ideas are analyzed in detail. 
3. Truth Seeking for Range Preserving Processes: The Funnel Theorem 
We begin the investigation of truth seeking behaviour as described in the Introduction by 
equation [2] with quite a general form of the social process f. Denote by K the set of all possi-
ble profiles x = (x1, x2, ..., xn ) with  x1  > 0, ..., xn  > 0. Then the social process f = (f1, ..., fn) 
with social components fi defines a selfmapping of K by  f (x) = ( f1 (x), ..., fn (x)). The only 
requirement on f in this section will be that for the set I = {1, 2, ..., n} of all agents and for all  
i ∈ I and all x∈ K it holds that 
[3] min{xj | j ∈ I } ≤ fi (x) ≤ max{ xj | j ∈ I }.   11
This assumption means that all agents will perform an opinion which remains in the range of 
opinions of the previous period which is given by the minimum and maximum of opinions in 
that period. We will refer to an f with this property as a range preserving social process. The 
social process for the LW– as well as for the BC–model is of this latter kind. The social proc-
ess for the LW–model is given by 
[4]  fi (x) = wi1 x1 + wi2 x2 + ... + win xn , 
where the weights wij are fixed values between 0 and 1. For the BC–model with confidence 
level ε and confidence sets I (i, x) = {1 ≤  j ≤  n |  | xi – xj| ≤  ε} the weights in [4] are al-
lowed to vary according to the rule 
[5]  wij = | I ( i, x)| 
–1  for  j ∈ I ( i, x) and wij = 0 for j ∉ I ( i, x).  
Since the weights in [4] sum up to 1 it follows immediately that the corresponding social 
process is range preserving. More general, if instead of the weighted arithmetic mean in [4] 
we would have another mean like the geometric mean, the harmonic mean, or any power 
mean the same argument as above shows the corresponding social process to be range pre-
serving. (For the social processes driven by various means see Hegselmann/Krause 2004. 
There a mapping f which satisfies property [3] is called an abstract mean.) 
Thus we shall consider truth seeking according to the Introduction, equation [2], that is 
[6]  xi (t + 1) = αi T + (1 - αi)  fi (x (t)), 1 ≤ i ≤ n , 
where f = (f1, ..., fn) is a range preserving social process. The question whether agent i ap-
proaches the truth T, that is limt→∞ xi (t) = T, obviously depends heavily on whether αi > 0 or 
αi  = 0. If αi  = 1 then agent i will find the truth in the next time step by himself without ex-
changing opinions with others. If, on the other extreme, αi  = 0 then the opinion of i depends 
solely on the exchange with others. In between, for 0 < αi  < 1, the opinion formation of i is 
guided by the truth as well as by exchanging ideas with others. Strictly speaking, approaching 
the truth depends also on the original opinion profile (x1 (0), x2 (0), ..., xn (0)). For example, if 
xi (0) = T for all agents i then all agents approach the truth in a trivial manner without any 
further assumption. In what follows, approaching the truth is throughout understood to hold 
for every original opinion profile. The following theorem describes how opinions come closer 
together within a certain 'funnel' and approach finally the truth (cf. Hegselmann 2004b). 
Though this result is rather general, its proof is simple and short enough to be presented here. 
Theorem 1 (Funnel theorem): 
If for truth seeking as modelled by equation [6] the social process is range preserving and all 
agents go for the truth, that is αi > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then consensus on the truth holds in the 
sense that all agents approach the truth. 
Proof: 
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Obviously,   for all i.  I f   (0) (0) (0) i uxv ≤≤ () () () i ut x t vt ≤ ≤  holds for some t and all i then 
from equations [3] and [6] we obtain for all i that  
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) (1 ) ( ). ii i ii Tu t x t Tv t α αα +− ≤ +≤ +− α    12
Taking the definitions [7] into account we obtain  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) f o r  a l l i ut x t vt i +≤ +≤ + .  
Thus, by the induction principle we conclude that 
[ ] 8 ( ) ( ) ( ) holds for all  and all i ut x t vt t i ≤≤  
that is, the opinions of all agents are always caught in the funnel as given by [7]. Furthermore, 
let α  be the smallest of the values  i α  and let α  be the biggest of the i α . By induction again 
the funnel can be described as follows, according to the three possibilities of how the truth 
value relates to the agents initial positions. 
Case 1: Tu   (0) (0). v ≤≤
Then  ( 1 )(( 0 ) ) () () ( 1 )(( 0 ) )
tt Tu .  T u t v t Tv T αα +− − = ≤ =+− −
v ≤≤ Case 2: uT   (0) (0).
Then  ( 1 )(( 0 ) ) () () ( 1 )(( 0 ) )
tt Tu .  T u t v t Tv T αα +− − = ≤ =+− −
T Case 3:  (see figure 9 below)  (0) (0) uv ≤≤
Then  ( 1 )(( 0 ) ) () () ( 1 )(( 0 ) )
tt Tu .  T u t v t Tv T αα +− − = ≤ =+− −
Now, by assumption 0 α <  and, hence, the lower wall   as well as the upper wall   of 
the funnel converge in all three cases to the truth value T. A fortiori, the agents’ opinions, 
which are caught within the funnel, must all converge to T.    
() ut () vt
Case 3 of the three possibilities above is illustrated below by means of simulations. There, the 
dotted line depicts the value of T and the funnel with walls   and vtis in black. The col-
oured curves within the funnel show the agents’ opinions converging to a consensus which 
approaches T. 
() ut ()
Figure 9: The Funnel theorem at work: consensus on the truth.   13
From the Funnel theorem we get immediately the following consequences. 
Corollary 1: 
Under the assumptions of the Funnel theorem with  
{ } { } min |1 and max | (0) |, (0) (0), | (0) | i in c v Tv u u T αα =≤ ≤ = − − −  
the following statements hold: 











(b) For the BC–model with confidence level ε  and all agents going for truth one obtains con-
sensus on the truth for the time period after 
*() 1 . t ε +  
Proof: 
(a) For a time period  we have that 
*() tt ≥Δ





Note that  ( log 1 ) α −  is negative, and hence (1 ) .
t c α − ⋅≤ Δ . From equation [8] and by inspect-
ing the three cases in the proof of the Funnel theorem we obtain that  
{ } | ( ) ( )| ( ) ( ) (1 ) max | (0) |, (0) (0), | (0)| .
t
ij xt xt v t u t v T v u T u α −≤ − ≤ − − − −  
Thus, by definition of c , we arrive at 
* | ( ) ( )| for   ( ) and all   and  . ij x tx t t t i j −≤ Δ ≥ Δ  
(b) The assertion follows from (a) for  ε Δ = , because in the BC–model a distance of at most 
ε  between the opinions of any two agents implies consensus in the next time step.         
The effect stated in Corollary 1 is illustrated by figure 10. 
Figure 10: Time as the great healer: All ε–splits close again in finite time. 
In figure 10 the funnel is marked black as in figure 9. Figure 10 shows in addition grey areas 
between two neighbouring opinions if and only if the distance between the two is not greater   14
than ε. Obviously all splits in the opinion profile close again. It is a remarkable feature of the 
Funnel theorem and in particular of the above Corollary that agents whose opinions would 
stay apart forever if there were the social process dynamics only, will come arbitrarily close 
together if they are α–positives, i.e., if they are going for the truth. 
Remark: The Funnel theorem as well as the Corollary 1 can be extended with essentially the 
same proofs to a case where not all agents go for the truth. I is now restricted to the set of 
 Seeking for Time Variant Processes: The Leading the Pack Theo-
rem 
ach a consensus arbitrarily close to the truth. What, however, about the others if only a 
( ) j
j
truth seeking agents, i.e. I = {i∈{1, …n}|αi >0}. Suppose I is not empty and that property [3] 
holds with respect to this subset I of {1, …, n}. Then all agents in the subset I will approach 
the truth. 
4. Truth
The Funnel Theorem of the previous section demonstrates that if all agents go for truth they 
will re
few agents go for truth? Figures 3, 4, and 7 give single run examples in which only half of all 
the agents are α–positives. Nevertheless the whole society ends up at the truth. In this chapter 
we will present analytical results which show that even one single α–positive agent can lead 
all others to the truth, provided the latter possess 'enough confidence'. In contrast to the Fun-
nel theorem the results do not hold for range preserving social processes in general, but for 
certain time variant social processes only, which nevertheless still include the LW– as well as 
the BC–model. Thus, we will consider a model for truth seeking of the type [6] where the so-
cial process is of the form 




f xt w t =∑ x t
=
 
re the nonnegative weights wij(t) add up to 1 for fixed i but are now admitted to vary with 
time t in such a way that for any two agents i, j and t ≥ 0 either w  (t) = 0 or w  (t) ≥  w  for 
ij 
. Thus, the BC–model 
ion to another paper. 
neralizes the corresponding one 
whe
ij ij
some fixed weight  w > 0. Obviously, the LW–model with time–independent weights is of this 
kind by taking w to be the smallest of all strictly positive weights. For the BC–model as de-
fined by equations [4] and [5] set 
[10]  wij (t) = |I (i, x (t))|
-1  for   j ∈ I (i, x (t)) and w (t) = 0 otherwise. 
Hence for wij (t) > 0 we have that wij (t) ≥ 1/n because of |I (i, x (t))|  ≤ n
is of the above kind with w = 1/n > 0. 
Beside the LW–model and the BC–model there are other interesting examples of time variant 
social processes. We leave their discuss
Before we can state our result on how a few agents may lead the whole pack to consensus–on-
the–truth we need the following important concept (which ge
in Hegselmann/Krause 2002, Appendix D). We say there is a confidence chain from agent i to 
agent j for the time interval (s, t) with s < t if there exists a chain of agents i0, i1, ..., ik  with i0 
= i  and ik  = j such that the weights 
 
01 12 1, ( 1), ( 2), , ( )
kk ii ii i i tw t w s w
− − − "  
are all strictly positive.    15
Additionally, we have to remind the definition of an irreducible matrix. A nonnegative  n×n-
matrix  A = (aij) is called  irreducible if for any two indices i,j ∈ {1, ..., n} there exists a se-
quence of indices such that   
11 2 1, 0.
k ii i i i j aa a
− ⋅> "
Further, we call a path t → (x1 (t), ..., xn (t)) an ε-profile for (i, j) and (s, t) if there exists a 
sequence of indices such that  
11 2 1 . | ( 1 ) ( 1 ) | ,| ( 2 ) ( 2 ) | , , | () () |
k ii i i i j xt xt xt xt x s xs ε εε
− −− − ≤ −− − ≤ − ≤ "  
Now we can state our second analytical result. 
Theorem 2 (Leading the pack theorem): 
Let a truth seeking model with a time variant social process given by 
[11] 
1
(1 ) ( 1 ) ( )( ) , 1
n
ii i i j j
j
x tT w t x t i αα
=
+= +− ≤ ≤ ∑ n  
with weights wij (t) such that either wij (t) = 0 or wij (t) ≥ w for some w > 0. Suppose there ex-
ists a sequence of time periods tm  with  2 ≤  tm − tm-1  ≤  r  for m = 1, 2, 3, ... such that for 
each agent not going for the truth and each m there exists a confidence chain to an agent going 
for the truth for the time interval (tm-1 + 1, tm). Then for the truth seeking model given by [11] 
there holds consensus–on–the–truth, i.e. for arbitrarily given initial opinions all agents will 
approach the truth. 
Proof: 
See the Appendix. 
Corollary 2: 
Consensus–on–the–truth holds 
(a) for the LW–model if the matrix W of weights is irreducible and at least one agent goes for 
the truth, 
(b) for the BC–model if there exist time periods tm as in Theorem 2 such that for each agent i  
not going for the truth there exists an agent j going for the truth such that paths are ε–profiles 
for (i, j) and  (tm-1 + 1, tm). 
Proof: 
The statements follow easily from Theorem 2 by taking into account the given definitions.   
Note that for the results above it is required that at least one agent goes for the truth. If this is 
not required, the model reduces to the ordinary opinion dynamics for which it is well known 
that irreducibility is not sufficient for a consensus. An analogue of part (a) of Corollary 2 has 
been obtained within a different framework in Friedkin and Johnsen (1990). Notice, however, 
that according to Theorem 2 in part (a) a weakened form of irreducibility would be sufficient. 
The following example demonstrates that, on the other hand, part (a) may fail for a matrix that 
is not irreducible. 















⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
=  
This matrix is not irreducible. Consider the truth seeking model with T > 0 and 0 < α1 < 1 
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Thus, there will be a stable configuration for t → ∞ with a consensus among agents 2 and 3 
who do not go for truth. There will be a consensus–on–the–truth if and only if T = c. Thus, for 
most of the original profiles there is no consensus–on–the–truth – though agent 1 is going for 
truth. Moreover, even the single agent 1 does not approach the truth. This is not in contradic-
tion to the above remark concerning the Funnel Theorem because the social process defined 
by matrix W is not range preserving with respect to I = {1}. 
Now, let the social process still be given by the not irreducible matrix W as above but change 
the truth seeking model a little bit by assuming that  0 < α2 < 1 whereas α3 = 0. Now agent 3 
is the only one not going for the truth and there is a chain of confidence to agent 2. Therefore, 
by theorem 2 there must be consensus–on–the–truth. It is amazing and the reader is invited to 
check directly for this example that limt→∞  x1 (t) = limt→∞ x2 (t) = limt→∞  x3 (t) = T – irrespec-
tive of the particular values of α1 and α2, as long as they are positive. This result cannot be 
concluded neither from part (a) of Corollary 2 not from the Funnel Theorem. To apply the 
latter one would need that the social process is range preserving with respect to {1, 2, 3} 
which is not the case. 
We illustrate part (b) of Corollary 2 by Figure 11a and 11b. Figures 11 a and b both simulate 
the same dynamics. But whereas Figure 11a shows only 20 periods, Figure 11b shows 300 
periods. A blue path represents an agent going for truth, a red path an agent not going for 
truth. Though there are only a few 'blue agents' one can find in Figure 1 for every 'red agent' 
an ε-profile with a blue agent on an appropriate time interval. Actually, this is possible in 
many different ways and the reader is invited to find some on his own. For example, one 
could even choose time intervals starting with 0 as well as profiles involving red agents from 
'different groups'. Another example would be to start in Figure 11a with period 8. At any pe-
riod after that each red agent has even a distance of at most ε to a blue agent. This holds in 
Figure 11a but it does not hold for ever as is clear from Figure 11b. There is a split in period 
90 between the lowest group of red agents and a group of blue agents because the latter uni-
fies with another group of blue agents due to attraction by the truth. This split will not be 
'healed' – in contrast to another split which is 'healed' at about period 160. According to the 
Leading the pack theorem the question of a consensus on the truth (for all agents) depends 
only on whether finally red agents will be connected to blue ones. In Figure 11b the lowest 
red group will never connect with a blue agent. As a consequence there will be no consensus 
on the truth that includes all agents. 
   17
 
Figure 11a and b:  Same dynamics after (a) 20 periods and (b) 300 periods. Red: α=0; blue: α = 0.1.  
Confidence level for all ε = 0.1. 
5. CASE–Studies II: Truth Deviation in the Parameter Space <T, F, ε, α > 
The Leading the pack Theorem implies for the BC–model that under certain conditions few or 
even one truth seeker may lead the pack to the truth. But when can we expect those conditions 
to be fulfilled? And where do the dynamics tend to end if such conditions are not fulfilled? By 
the CASE–studies in chapter 2 we know already that the chances of a final consensus on the 
truth depend crucially on the frequency of α–positives, the position of the truth, the confi-
dence level ε  and the strength α of the truth attraction. Thus, we are facing a 4–dimensional 
parameter space. In this chapter we will analyze that parameter space by systematic simula-
tions. The guiding research question will be: What average truth deviation do we have to ex-
pect in the parameter space after the dynamics has stabilized? Truth deviation could be 
measured in different ways. We will do it in a way that closely follows the definition of the   18
standard deviation. We simply substitute the mean by T. Thus truth deviation δ (t) is defined 
as follows: 











=− ∑ t  
Analysing a 4–dimensional parameter space is hard enough a task. Therefore all other things 
are kept as simple as possible: We assume, first, homogeneous, symmetric, and constant con-
fidence levels ε for all individuals, second, a homogeneous and constant α for all α–positives, 
third, a fixed number of 100 individuals, fourth, a uniform start distribution, and, finally, si-
multaneous updating. 
The simulation results on average truth deviation in 4–dimensional parameter space will be 
visualized to allow for a fast and easy understanding of our CASE–studies. More in detail, we 
will vary the parameters as follows: 
1.  The position of the truth T: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. 
2.  The frequency F of agents with α = 0: 10%, 50%, 90%. 
3.  The confidence level: ε = 0.01, 0.02, …, 0.4; i.e. 40 steps. 
4.  The strength of the truth directedness: α = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 1.0; i.e. 100 steps. 
As to T and F the simulation strategy is a scenario approach. The truth may be in the centre of 
the opinion space, the truth may be an extreme or lies somewhere in between. Almost all, half 
or only some of the agents may be non truth seekers. Together that is a total of 3×3 scenarios. 
As to ε and α we follow a grid approach with 40×100 points.  Figure 12 explains the com-
bined scenario and grid approach. 
Figure 12: The combined grid and scenario approach. 
For each of the 40×100 grid points of the 3×3 scenarios we run 50 simulations until the dy-
namics is stable. Then we calculate the average truth deviation and encode the numerical 
value by a colour. As a consequence all simulation results can be presented in the one huge 
graphics given by figure 13.   19
Figure 13: Truth deviation in the parameter space <T, F,ε, α >. 
Most striking in figure 13 are the huge black areas in all scenarios. In these regions of the pa-
rameter space the average truth deviation is 0. Thus the agents finally ended up with a consen-
sus on the truth. 
Observation 7: 
Where ever the truth is located, whether there is a tiny minority or even an overwhelming 
majority of truth seekers, under suitable values for the confidence level and the strength of the 
attraction of truth the whole society will end up with a consensus on the truth. 
For such a consensus on the truth there have to be the right proportions between ε and α as 
stated in observation 8 and 9. 
Observation 8: 
For almost all T, F, and α there seems to be a critical value ε* for the confidence level such 
that a consensus on the truth is possible only if ε  > ε*. The critical confidence level that has 
to be exceeded increases as the strength α of truth attraction increases. If the truth is in the 
centre of the opinion space the critical confidence level is lower than for more extreme truths. 
With exception of the scenario <T=0.1, F=90%> it seems that for a given position of the truth 
the critical value ε* slightly decreases if F increases. 
   20
 
Observation 9: 
For almost all T, F, and ε  there seems to be a critical value α* for the strength of the attrac-
tion of truth such that for a consensus on the truth it is necessary that α < α*. If the truth is in 
the centre and the confidence level sufficiently high, then a consensus will be reached with 
any α. For most parts of the scenarios the critical value α* that must not be exceeded de-
creases as the confidence level ε  decreases. It may be that for F=90% and low confidence 
levels consensus on the truth is only possible for values of α much smaller than those we used 
in our simulations. 
Not all parameter constellations finally end up with a consensus on the truth. As it seems there 
are conditions in which it is more and those in which it is less difficult to get at least close to 
the truth:  
Observation 10: 
If for a certain parameter constellation <α,ε > there is a positive truth deviation in all scenar-
ios <T, F>, then these truth deviations tend to be higher for higher frequencies F and more 
extreme truths T. 
For an interpretation of most of these observations it is necessary to understand two effects: 
The first might be called the take–along–effect: Even a single truth seeker can drive a whole 
society to the truth by taking along the others. The effect works for small minorities of α–
positives as well. More general: Via the social exchange process truth seekers can take along 
those which do not go for the truth or do not succeed in doing so. But for that to be the case 
the values for α and ε have to have the right proportion: Given a confidence level the attrac-
tion of truth must not be too strong; given the attraction of truth the confidence level has to be 
high enough. Figure 14a (top) gives an example. Here the one and lonely truth seeker takes 
along all others direction T. The second effect works in the opposite direction: Truth seekers 
may be 'too good' to take along the others. Figure 14b (bottom) gives an example.  Here a 
comparatively small group of extremely good truth seekers crosses the whole opinion space 
very fast in direction of an extreme truth. Though at the beginning scattered over the whole 
opinion space they leave behind them a polarized society whose opinions they didn't manage 
to influence significantly. The effect could be called the leaving–behind–effect.   21
Figure 14: (a) take–along–effect (T= 0.1, α = 0.1,ε = 0.2). (b) leaving–behind–effect (T = 0.02, α = 0.9,ε = 0.2). 
Figure 13 shows the truth deviation after the dynamics stabilized. But how does the truth de-
viation develop over time. A simulation based answer is given by the following movie. Each 
of its 51 pictures has the structure of figure 13 and shows period wise the truth deviations up 
to period 50. A difference to figure 13 is that in the movie the confidence level is analysed in 
50 steps up to ε = 0.5.   22
Movie: Truth deviation up to period 50. 
The whole movie can be found at http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/3/10/Movie_Truth_Deviation.avi
By looking at the movie one can verify at least the following observations: 
Observation 11: 
In all scenarios it is the upper right corner, i.e. the region where high confidence levels are 
combined with a strong truth attraction, where the most significant decrease in the truth de-
viation starts. The decrease spreads to the left, i.e. in the direction of less strong truth attrac-
tion, and to the bottom, i.e. in the direction of lower confidence levels. 
Observation 12: 
The truth deviations goes down especially fast if the truth is in the centre T= 0.5 and/or the 
frequency of agents not interested in the truth is small (F = 10%). 
Observation 13: 
The final structure after stabilization as we know it from figure 13 emerges very early. The 
most significant difference to the final structure can be found for small values of α. The dif-
ference is more severe if the truth is more extreme and/or the frequency of agents going for 
the truth is small. 
Obviously CASE–studies like the ones above allow studying epistemic constellations under 
the perspective when and why the spreading of the truth may be more or less difficult.    23
5. Research Perspectives 
The most striking result of the analytical and simulation based results presented here is proba-
bly that in our model the combined cognitive and social dynamics under lots of circumstances 
ends up with an all including consensus on the truth. That sounds a bit like assumptions in the 
wake of the so called consensus theory of truth as it was outlined by Jürgen Habermas and his 
followers (cf. Habermas 1973). However, one should note that the concept of truth as as-
sumed in our approach, though being compatible with a huge variety of different truth con-
ceptions, is not compatible with what is called the consensus theory of truth. We assume the 
existence of a true value which is totally independent of what is believed to be the case, while 
in the consensus theory of truth a special consensus constitutes the true value. Additionally, in 
our approach a community may definitely fail to reach a consensus at the truth. The leaving–
behind–effect may result in a situation in which the truth seekers end up at the truth but among 
themselves while all others live (possibly polarized) far distant from the truth somewhere in 
the opinion space. 
The framework we presented here allows the study of social and epistemic processes in which 
more or less successful truth seekers are at the same time involved in social exchange proc-
esses. The framework allows studying the dynamics of stylized epistemic constellations. For 
the research perspective within this framework one should note: 
•  One can focus on difficult situation for spreading the truth, for instance opinion leaders 
with positions far distant from the truth and not interested in the truth, confidence intervals 
with a bias against the truth or a peak far distant from the truth in the start distribution. 
•  The fairly optimistic idealized assumptions on T could be given up. For instance, new evi-
dences may point into two or more different directions.  
•  We took the strength of the attraction of truth as given. Another view could be to look at α 
as a parameter that can be influenced by intervention. Under such a view one might start 
thinking on efficient truth proliferation policies: Where in the opinion spectrum should 
one make how much agents to truth seekers in order to make all or at least a significant 
part of a society believing in the truth? What if there is time pressure? What to do if the 
social exchange process has a network structure with primarily local interactions? 
•  In this article the bounded confidence model plays an important role. But the general 
framework is not necessarily tied to the BC–model for the social process. There are other 
mechanisms as well, for instance mechanisms which are not range preserving.  
Thus the framework, the methods, and results suggest that there is a realistic perspective for a 
social epistemology that addresses theoretical and technical question on the spreading of 
truths. 
APPENDIX: Proof of the Leading the pack theorem 
To prove Theorem 2, we first reformulate the model given by equation [11], that is 
1
( 1 ) ( 1 ) () () ,1
n
ii i i j j
j
x tT w t x t i αα
=
+= +− ≤ ≤ ∑ n , 
by adding an artificial agent 0 with the dynamics  
x0(t +1) = x0(t) for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... and  x0 (0) = T. 
Let  x(t) = (x0 (t), x1 (t), ..., xn (t)) (column vector) and define the matrix    24


















where the elements of the n × n-matrix Wα(t) are given by (1 – αi) wij (t)  for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. 
The models equation [11] can be compactly written as 
[14]     x (t + 1) = A (t) x (t),   x (0) = (T, x1 (0), ..., xn (0)) 
To this discrete dynamical system we will apply a stability theorem from Hegselmann/Krause 
(2002, Theorem 4) and from Krause (2003, Theorem 1, p. 203) which yields consensus, 
limt→∞ xi (t) = c  for  i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, provided the following assumption is satisfied for the 
entries bij(t, s) of the matrix B(t, s) = A (t – 1) A (1 – 2) ... A (s) for s < t: There exist a se-
quence t0 < t1 < t2 <... of time periods and a sequence  such 
that for all m≥1, 1≤ i, j ≤ n 
12
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In the stability theorem as cited above it is assumed that t0 = 0. We may, however, let t0 be 
arbitrary by choosing δk = 0 for finitely many periods. 
Before demonstrating this assumption to be satisfied let us check that consensus for model 
[14] yields consensus–on–the–truth for our truth seeking model. Because of x0 (t) = T for all t 
we have that c = T and, hence, limt→∞ xi (t) = T  for 1≤ i ≤ n. 
The main step in proving [15] is the following lemma. 
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Proof:  We prove [16] by induction over t for s fixed. Suppose first t = s +1. 
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 with v’ = u α + Wα (s) v by [11]. Thus, equation 
[16] holds for t = s + 1 (by convention the empty product of matrices is the identity matrix). 
Now, by induction hypothesis  
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we obtain that formula [16] holds for B (t + 1, s), too.                                                                 







 for u = 1 and   v = (0, ..., 0). Therefore, by 
the lemma we obtain for 1≤i≤n  
1
1
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where M (k) = (mij (k)) = Wα (t – 1) Wα (t – 2) ... Wα (t – k)   for  0 ≤ k ≤ t – s – 1. 
For the sequence (tm) of time periods assumed in Theorem 2 we shall show that for all 1≤i≤n 
[18]  bi1 (tm, t m-1) ≥ δm  with δm = min{αi | αi  > 0} w 
r – 1 . 
For, if 1≤ i ≤ n with αi > 0 then from [17] for k = 0 we have that  bi1 (tm, tm-1) ≥ αi ≥ δm, 
since w ≤ 1. If  αi = 0 then by the assumption in Theorem 2 there exists a confidence chain 
(i0, i1, ..., ik)  from  i = i0  to  ik = j  for the interval  (tm-1 + 1, tm) such that αj > 0.Without loss 
let   0
h i α =   for  0 ≤ h ≤ k – 1 . That is, 
11 2 1 , 1 (1 ) ,(2 ) , , ( 1
k ii m i i m i j m wt wt w t
− − ) − −+ "  are all 
strictly positive and, hence, greater or equal to w. From [17] we obtain for t = tm, s = tm-1 and k 
= tm – tm-1 – 1 
11 1 1, (, ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) .
k im m i j j i im ij m j btt mk wt w t1 α α
− −− ≥≥ − + "  
Because of and k = t
11 ,1 (1 ) ( 1 )
k ii m i j m wt w t w
− − −+ " ≥ m – tm-1 – 1 ≤ r – 1 by assumption we ar-
rive at inequality [18]. The latter implies in particular inequality [15] which together with 







=∞ ∑ m = min{ αi | αi  > 0}w
r-1 > 0 for all  m completes the proof of Theorem 2.      
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